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Abstract
The physiologist Claude Bernard was an important nineteenth-
century methodologist of the life sciences. Here I place his thought
in the context of the history of the vera causa standard, arguably the
dominant epistemology of science in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. Its proponents held that in order for a cause to be
legitimately invoked in a scientific explanation, it must be shown by
direct evidence to exist and to be competent to produce the effects as-
cribed to it. Historians of scientific method have argued that in the
course of the nineteenth century the vera causa standard was super-
seded by a more powerful consequentialist epistemology, which also
admitted indirect evidence for the existence and competence of causes.
The prime example of this is the luminiferous ether, whichwaswidely
accepted, in the absence of direct evidence, because it entailed veri-
fied observational consequences and, in particular, successful novel
predictions. According to the received view, the vera causa standard’s
demand for direct evidence of existence and competence came to be
seen as an impracticable and needless restriction on the scope of le-
gitimate inquiry into the fine structure of nature. The Mill-Whewell
debate has been taken to exemplify this shift in scientific epistemol-
ogy, with Whewell’s consequentialism prevailing over Mill’s defense
of the older standard. However, Bernard’s reflections on biological
practice challenge the received view. His methodology marked a sig-
nificant extension of the vera causa standard that made it both power-
ful and practicable. In particular, Bernard emphasized the importance
of detection procedures in establishing the existence of unobservable
entities. Moreover, his sophisticated notion of controlled experimen-
tation permitted inferences about competence even in complex bio-
logical systems. In the life sciences, the vera causa standard began to
flourish precisely around the time of its alleged abandonment.
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Mais la science n’avancerait jamais si l’on se
croyait autorisé à renoncer aux méthodes
scientifiques parce qu’elles sont imparfaites; la
seule chose à faire en ce cas, c’est de les
perfectionner.
— Claude Bernard, Introduction à l’étude de la
médecine expérimentale (1865)
1 Introduction
The nineteenth century witnessed a clash between two different concep-
tions of legitimate scientific method. One side held that entities may only
be invoked in scientific explanations if their real existence can be supported
directly, in the paradigmatic case by observation. Such entities were “true
causes” or verae causae, following Newton’s terminology in the Principia.
The other side thought it legitimate to invoke hypothetical entities in scien-
tific explanations, so long as their existence could be supported indirectly
by their observable consequences. I will refer to the first group as adherents
of the vera causa standard, and to the second as proponents of a consequen-
tialist theory of evidence.
On a received view of the history of scientific method, consequentialism
started out as a minority view but eventually prevailed.1 This shift was ex-
emplified by the debate between John Stuart Mill and WilliamWhewell, in
which a central point of contentionwas the acceptability of the luminiferous
ether as a physical substrate for the wave theory of light. Mill argued that
the ether did not meet the evidential demands of the vera causa standard.
Neither its existence nor its competence to produce the effects ascribed to
it had been demonstrated by direct evidence. That the ether hypothesis ex-
plained the phenomena of light was no reason to accept it, since any num-
ber of unconceived alternative hypotheses might furnish such explanations
as well. Whewell, by contrast, argued that the luminiferous ether did not
just explain a wide range of phenomena, but had also predicted phenom-
1See the essays collected in Larry Laudan’s Science and Hypothesis (1981), especially chap-
ter 7, “ThomasReid and theNewtonian Turn of BritishMethodological Thought”, and chap-
ter 8, “The Epistemology of Light: SomeMethodological Issues in the Subtle FluidsDebate”.
See also Laura Snyder (1997b), and the discussion in Section 2.3.
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ena different from the ones the hypothesis was originally conceived to ex-
plain. He thought that this provided genuine, albeit indirect, evidence for
the ether’s existence. On the received view, the demands of the vera causa
standard came to be seen as limiting, and something like Whewell’s conse-
quentialism came to be widely accepted as the appropriate tool for probing
the unobservable fine structure of nature. This historical account was artic-
ulated in the second half of the twentieth century and coheredwell with the
accounts of scientific epistemology of the time, which were predominantly
consequentialist. They included Hypothetico-Deductivism, Falsification-
ism, and Inference to the Best Explanation.
The thesis of this paper is that the vera causa standard not only sur-
vived but even flourished in the second half of the nineteenth century. If
we turn our attention to the life sciences, the notion of a decisive shift to
consequentialism collapses. I will argue that far from being soundly re-
jected as an epistemic guidepost, the vera causa standard was turned from
an unachievable ideal into a practicable methodology by researchers in bi-
ology and medicine. A testament to this fact are the writings of one of the
leading nineteenth-century methodologists of the life sciences: the French
physician and physiologist Claude Bernard (1813-1878). In his seminal and
influential Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865), Bernard
articulated a sophisticated and powerful version of the vera causa approach.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 revisits the origins, de-
velopment, and demise of the vera causa standard. Section 3 shows that
Bernard’s methodological and scientific writings advanced the vera causa
standard towards a practicable method of inquiry. Unlike earlier articu-
lations of the standard, Bernard’s version was expansive in its ability to
accommodate unobservable causes, and powerful in its provisions for con-
trolling known and unknown confounders in experiments. Section 4 con-
cludes the discussion.
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2 The rise and fall of the vera causa standard
2.1 Origins
The term vera causa traces back to Newton’s Principia.2 At the beginning
of the third book, Newton presented methodological principles that were
labeled as “regulæ philosophandi”, or rules of philosophizing, from the sec-
ond edition onward.3 The first rule reads:
Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere, quam quæ
& veræ sint & earum Phænomenis explicandis sufficiant. (New-
ton 1713, 357)
We are to “admit no more causes of natural things, than such as are both
true and sufficient to explain their appearances” (Newton 1729, 202).
To some, such as the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid
(1710–1796), Newton’s first rule was “the true and proper test, by which
what is sound and solid in philosophy may be distinguished from what
is hollow and vain” (Reid 1863, 236). But the rule required considerable
unpacking before it could be seen as a practicablemethodological guide. Its
demands can appear vacuous, since it is little help to be told that one should
search for true rather than false causes, or sufficient rather than insufficient
ones. Indeed, the editor of Reid’s collected works considered the rule a
“barren truism” (Reid 1863, 236, footnote).
As Reid interpreted the first rule, however, it made two substantial de-
mands.4 First, the appropriate contrast for a true causewas not a false cause,
but a speculative cause, a cause thatmight explain the phenomena but whose
existence is uncertain. Reid thought that explaining by speculative causes
was too easy:
2An important resource on the history and philosophy of the vera causa standard is the
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Kavaloski (1974). Hodge (1977, 1992) has written ex-
tensively about the standard as it relates to Darwin’s Origin of Species. More recently, veræ
causæ have enjoyed renewed interest from Novick (2016), Pence (2018), and Novick and
Scholl (2018).
3For the editorial history of the regulæ, see Newton (1999, 794) and Ducheyne (2015). On
recent debates concerning the status of the regulæ, see Biener (2018) and Di Fate (2011).
4My historical interpretation of Reid’s views on veræ causæ is mainly indebted to Laudan
(1981a), but also to Wood (1989) and Callergård (1999). For more on Reid’s philosophy of
science see also Ducheyne (2006) andCallergård (2006), and for an overview of Reid’s works
see Cuneo and Van Woudenberg (2004).
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If the hypothesis hangs well together, is embellished by a lively
imagination, and serves to account for common appearances,
it is considered by many as having all the qualities that should
recommend it to our belief, and all that ought to be required in
a philosophical system. (235)
But such reasoning had led some to think that the earth is supported by a
huge elephant standing on a huge tortoise, or that the planets are moved
by Cartesian vortices (234–235). To guard against speculative explanations,
Reid interpreted the demand for a true cause as the demand for evidence
that the cause really exists:
If a philosopher … pretends to shew us the cause of any nat-
ural effect, whether relating to matter or to mind, let us first
consider whether there is sufficient evidence that the cause he
assigns does really exist. If there is not, reject it with disdain, as
a fiction which ought to have no place in genuine philosophy.
(236)
Thus, demonstrating the existence of a cause required something in addi-
tion to mere explanatory power. This is the existence requirement of the vera
causa standard.
On Reid’s interpretation, the secondmethodological demand of the first
rule was that once a cause was known to exist, its ability to produce the
effects ascribed to it needed to be supported by evidence. He wrote:
If the cause assigned really exists, consider, in the next place,
whether the effect it is brought to explain necessarily follows
from it. (236)
To demonstrate that a cause is “sufficient to produce the effect” (250) is the
competence requirement.
It is helpful to illustrate Reid’s views by a concrete example. Reid ex-
tensively criticized David Hartley’s (1749) Observations on Man, which pro-
posed a “doctrine of vibrations” to explain the operation of the senses and
themind.5 Hartley’s fourth Proposition expressed one of the doctrine’s fun-
damental assumptions:
5For an overview of Hartley’s work, see Allen (2017).
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External Objects impressed upon the Senses occasion, first in the
Nerves on which they are impressed, and then in the Brain, Vi-
brations of the small, and, as onemay say, infinitesimal,medullary
Particles. (Hartley 1749, 11)
According to Reid, however, the existence such vibrations was unproven.
Hartley had argued that “no motion, besides a vibratory one, can reside
in any part for a moment of time” (Reid 1863, 250). But Reid could refute
this by naming other continuing motions, “such as rotation, bending or un-
bending of a spring, and perhaps others which we are unacquainted with”
(250). The possibility of unconceived alternatives blocked Hartley’s conse-
quentialist inference to the existence of vibrations.
Since the existence of the postulated vibrations was uncertain, the ques-
tion of whether they were competent to produce sensations and ideas was
not even amenable to inquiry. Reid asked:
[H]ow can we expect any proof of the connection between vi-
brations and thought, when the existence of such vibrationswas
never proved? … The existence of both must be known before
we can know their connection. (252)
To understand this part of Reid’s critique, it is instructive to contrast the
doctrine of vibrations with a similar explanation that Reid regarded as suc-
cessful: the explanation of sound in terms of vibrations of the air. According
to Reid, such vibrations were known to be competent to produce the effects
ascribed to them:
[W]e know that, as the vibration is strong or weak, the sound is
loud or low; we know that, as the vibration is quick or slow, the
sound is acute or grave. … [A]nd all this is not conjectured, but
proved by a sufficient induction. (253)
Reid did not specify in what sense the competence requirement in this case
was fulfilled by a “sufficient induction”. He only wrote that the vibrations
of air “tally exactly” (253) with the phenomena of sound. Wewill see below
how later authors expanded upon this notion.
In summary, Reid interpreted Newton’s first rule in terms of two sub-
stantial demands. First, legitimate scientific explanationsmust invoke causes
whose existence can be supported by good evidence. Crucially, explanatory
7
success alone does not count as good evidence. Second, legitimate explana-
tions must invoke causes that are demonstrably competent to produce the
kinds of effects ascribed to them. Reid insisted that unless a causal explana-
tion meets both conditions, it is “good for nothing” (236, 250). In this con-
text, Reid cited with approval Newton’s famous dictum “hypotheses non
fingo” from the General Scholium of the Principia (236). Having shown the
effects of the force of gravity in the planetary system, Newton could only
have speculated about the underlying cause of gravity itself, and he refused
to do so.6
2.2 Development
In the early nineteenth century, further developments concerned particu-
larly the competence requirement. The contributions of two philosophers
stand out: John Herschel and John Stuart Mill.
John Herschel
In thePreliminaryDiscourse on the Study ofNatural Philosophy, Herschel (1830)
understood the goal of natural philosophy to be the explanation of phenom-
ena in terms of an “immediate producing cause” (144, §137). As science
progresses, our knowledge of such causes accumulates:
Experience having shown us the manner in which one phenom-
enon depends on another in a great variety of cases, we find our-
selves provided, as science extends, with a continually increas-
ing stock of such antecedent phenomena, or causes (meaning
at present merely proximate causes) competent, under different
modifications, to the production of a great multitude of effects,
besides those which originally led to a knowledge of them. To
such causes Newton has applied the term veræ causæ; that is,
causes recognized as having a real existence in nature, and not
being mere hypotheses or figments of the mind. (144, §138)
We see here the familiar components of the vera causa standard. Veræ causæ
have “a real existence” and are notmere “hypotheses”. Theymust be “com-
6On the meaning and the English translation of Newton’s dictum, see Cohen (1962). For
a recent analysis of the methodology of the Principia, see Smith (2002).
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petent” to produce their effects.7 Crucially, they provide explanations for
phenomena that are different from the ones “which originally led to a knowl-
edge of them”.
Herschel illustrated the force of these distinctions by an example from
actual science:
Thephenomenonof shells found in rocks, at a great height above
the sea, has been attributed to several causes. By some it has
been ascribed to a plastic virtue in the soil; by some, to fermen-
tation; by some, to the influence of the celestial bodies; by some,
to the casual passage of pilgrims with their scallops; by some, to
birds feeding on shell-fish; and by all modern geologists, with
one consent, to the life and death of real mollusca at the bottom
of the sea, and a subsequent alteration of the relative level of the
land and sea. (144–45, §138)
He went through these possibilities in quick succession. The plastic virtues
and celestial influences did not meet the existence requirement since they
were “figments of fancy” (145, §138). Fermentation as a cause of shells in
rocks failed the competence requirement, “since no such thingwas everwit-
nessed as one of its effects, and rocks and stones do not ferment” (145, §138).
Casual transport met the existence and competence requirements but was
“not extensive enough” to be responsible for the phenomenon (145, §138).
Only the transport of actual organic remains by known geological processes
met the criteria of existence, competence, and sufficiency in magnitude.
One of Herschel’s key contributions to the vera causa standard was his
articulation of more precise methods for determining competence. He be-
gan by outlining some of the characteristics of “that relation which we in-
tend by cause and effect” (151, §145). According to Herschel, there is an
“invariable connection” between cause and effect, and also an “invariable
negation of the effect with absence of the cause”, unless the effect can be
produced by multiple causes (151, §145). Moreover, if it is possible to pro-
duce an “increased or diminished intensity of the cause”, then there will
also be an “[i]ncrease or diminution of the effect” (151–52, §145).
7I agreewith Pence (2018) that a vera causa inHerschel’s writings can be any entity known
to exist, but I take the methodological standard to require evidence of both existence and
competence.
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Herschel enumerated a total of ten epistemic strategies for determining
causal relationships, of which I will discuss a selection. In a nod to Newton,
he described these strategies as “rules of philosophizing” (152, §146).8 A
first rule is that if there is an “attendant circumstance” which is absent from
some instances of a type of effect, then that circumstance “cannot be the
cause we seek” (152, §146).9 A second rule states that if all instances of an
effect agree in a circumstance, then this circumstance may be the cause we
seek, or else a “collateral effect” of it (152, §146).
The fifth rule connects directly with Reid’s discussion of vibratory theo-
ries. Herschel returned to the example of the connection between vibrations
of the air and the pitch of sounds. He argued that we can impart impulses
of equal force but increasing frequency to the air, and that this will be per-
ceived first as “a rattling noise, then a lowmurmur, and then a hum, which
by degrees acquires the character of amusical note” (153, §153). This iswhat
allows us to infer the competence of the cause to produce the effect:
[F]rom this correspondence between the pitch of the note and
the rapidity of succession of the impulse, we conclude that our
sensation of the different pitches of musical notes originates in
the different rapidities with which their impulses are communi-
cated to our ears. (153–54, §153)
Remember Reid’s phrasing that the cause and effect in this case “tally ex-
actly”. Herschel’s fifth rule explicates this notion in terms of a correspon-
dence between the intensities of the cause and of its effect, which, as we saw
above, he took to be characteristic of causal relationships.
Herschel considered his seventh rule to be among the most conclusive.
It articulates the notion of varying one thing at a time while keeping all else
equal:
If we can either find produced by nature, or produce designedly
for ourselves, two instances which agree exactly in all but one
particular, and differ in that one, its influence in producing the
phenomenon, if it have any, must thereby be rendered sensi-
ble.10 (154, §156, original emphasis)
8The full complement of rules is discussed by Herschel (1830) in paragraphs §146–162;
see also Ducasse (1960) and Cobb (2012).
9Assuming, again, that the effect is not produced by multiple causes.
10The rule as stated is unsound. If the two instances are exactly alike but an alternative
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Herschel recognized that the difficulty of the rule lies in the conditional. It
licenses an inference only if two instances agree in all but one particular,
and such instances are difficult to find in nature. The conclusiveness of an
experiment depends precisely on the comparability of its instances:
[Two instances] becomemore valuable, and their results clearer,
in proportion as they possess this quality (of agreeing exactly in
all their circumstances but one), since the question put to nature
becomes thereby more pointed, and its answer more decisive.
(155, §156)
Having recognized the importance of the question, Herschel had little more
to say about how two comparable instances are found, except that theywere
“easy to produce” with the aid of experiments (155, §156).
Finally, Herschel’s ninth rule states that if a phenomenon is produced
by several interacting causes (“concurring, opposing, or quite independent
of each other”, 156, §158), we can subtract the effects of all known causes so
as to leave a “residual phenomenon” to be explained. Herschel considered
this rule to be the one by which “science, in its present advanced state, is
chiefly promoted” (156, §158).
John Stuart Mill
Next to Herschel, John Stuart Mill was the most prominent nineteenth-
century proponent of the vera causa standard. His treatment of causation
and causal inference followed Herschel’s structure. Mill began book III of
the System of Logic with chapters focusing on the nature of causation (Mill
1974, especially III.IV–III.VI). WhileMill’s causalmetaphysics is outside the
scope of this paper, it is important to see that Mill’s discussion refined Her-
schel’s. Mill discussed the notion of invariable antecedents in much greater
detail, with particular attention to the complexity of most causal processes.
While individual antecedent conditionswere usually described as the cause
of a phenomenon, Mill insisted that the cause of a phenomenon, properly
speaking, is an “assemblage” of antecedent conditions. He also discussed
the “composition of causes”, distinguishing different ways in which causes
can interact.
cause of the effect acts in both, then thismaymask the action of the cause under investigation.
Mill’s version of this rule (see below) avoids this difficulty.
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Like Herschel before him, Mill understood these preliminary considera-
tions to be a foundation for a set of epistemic strategies: Mill’s fourmethods
of experimental inquiry (III.VIII). In a letter to Herschel, Mill wrote that the
four methods constituted “the most important chapter of the book”, but
were also “little more than an expansion & a more scientific statement of
what you had previously stated”.11
Thus, Herschel’s first and second rules became the method of agreement;
the fifth rule became the method of concomitant variation; and the ninth rule
became themethod of residues. Most importantly, Herschel’s seventh rule be-
came the method of difference. Mill framed the method as a kind of inference
schema:
If our object be to discover the effects of an agent A, we must
procure A in some set of ascertained circumstances, as A B C,
and having noted the effects produced, compare them with the
effect of the remaining circumstances B C, when A is absent. If
the effect of A B C is a b c, and the effect of B C, b c, it is evident
that the effect of A is a. (III.VIII.§2, 391)
The method of difference compared instances of occurrence with instances
of non-occurrence, to see in what they differed.12
Like Herschel, Mill thought that the method of difference was partic-
ularly decisive. The other methods could reveal candidate causes, but it
was only by the method of difference that “we can ever, in the way of
direct experience, arrive with certainty at causes” (394, III.VIII.§3).13 Mill
agreedwithHerschel that natural instancesmeeting the requirements of the
method were rare, but that in experiments “a pair of instances such as the
method requires is obtained almost as a matter of course” (393, III.VIII.§3).
He argued that intervention ensures the comparability of instances:
We choose a previous state of things with which we are well
acquainted, so that no unforeseen alteration in that state is likely to
11The letter is dated May 1, 1843, and cited in Mill (1974, lxviii). Herschel himself traced
the rules to Bacon’s “prerogatives of instances” (§190–200).
12Mill’s articulation of the difference-making idea does not suffer from the problem dis-
cussed in fn. 10. If an alternative cause were masking the effect of the cause under investi-
gation, then we would see no difference between the instances and no inference would be
warranted.
13But see Ducheyne (2008) on Mill’s changing views about whether the method of differ-
ence affords certainty.
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pass unobserved; and into this we introduce, as rapidly as possible,
the phenomenon which we wish to study; so that in general we
are entitled to feel complete assurance that the pre-existing state,
and the state which we have produced, differ in nothing except
the presence or absence of that phenomenon. (393, III.VIII.§3,
my emphases)
These notions are sensible but demanding. If no relevant alterations in the
initial state are to “pass unobserved”, then experimental inferences are only
possible if all relevant confounders are antecedently known. Similarly, if
the goal is to act swiftly “before there has been time for any change in the
other elements” (393, III.VIII.§3), this requires that we know about the time
scale at which all relevant confounders act. We will see below that this de-
manding notion of comparability led Mill to put significant limits on the
scope of the method of difference.
To conclude, Herschel andMill offered successive refinements of strate-
gies for assessingwhether causes that are known to exist are also competent
to produce the phenomena ascribed to them. Both assigned great impor-
tance to the study of differences between comparable instances, but neither
had a satisfying account of how comparable instances can be found or pro-
duced.
2.3 Demise
Historians of scientific method have argued that the vera causa standard
came to be seen as an impediment to the progress of theoretical science in
the course of the nineteenth century (see Laudan 1981a, 1981b, and refer-
ences below). At issue were in particular explanations of phenomena in
terms of the behavior of subtle fluids. Today, the best known theory of this
kind is the explanation of light in terms of vibrations in a luminiferous ether.
But at the time, similar theories were proffered for the explanation of heat,
magnetism, electricity, and other processes.
We encountered an eighteenth-century instance of such theorizing in
Section 2.1, in the form of Hartley’s doctrine of vibrations. Reid criticized
the hypothesis for failing to meet the existence and competence require-
ments. However, Hartley did not accept Reid’s epistemological standards.
He wrote that even if we suppose a postulated entity to be “destitute of
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all direct Evidence, still, if it serves to explain and account for a great Va-
riety of Phenomena, it will have an indirect Evidence in its favour by this
means” (Hartley 1749, 15). Thus, Hartley proposed a consequentialist the-
ory of evidence, one that allowed the existence and properties of entities
to be supported indirectly by their verifiable observable consequences. In
effect, he tried to turn what had always been a necessary condition for sci-
entific theorizing, to save the phenomena, into a sufficient condition.
Laudan agreed with Reid and other eighteenth-century methodologists
that simple versions of consequentialism, such as Hartley’s, were “uncon-
vincing and inadequate” (1981, 111). But he also argued that Reid’s own
vera causa standard was far too limited:
As Reid construes the first regula, it amounts to the claim that
any putative causal explanation (a) must be sufficient to explain
the relevant appearances and (b) must postulate entities and
mechanisms whose existence can be directly ascertained. Con-
dition (b) is the crucial one because it is meant to explicate the
demand for ‘true causes’. What this amounts to is the claim that
unobservable entities, because we can have no direct evidence of
their existence, have no role to play in causal explanations. (Laudan
1981a, 93, original emphases)
On this interpretation, scientific theorizing about unobservables entitieswas
beginning to chafe against a restrictive methodological doctrine. However,
the consequentialist alternative was still far too permissive to be a plausible
replacement.
According to Laudan, more sophisticated versions of consequentialism
were developed, and came to be accepted, as scientific theorizing about un-
observables progressed during the nineteenth century. The famous debate
between Mill and William Whewell has been seen as an expression of this
shift. On one side, Mill defended the vera causa standard. On the other,
Whewell defended a new consequentialism. One of the main points of con-
troversy was the acceptability of the luminiferous ether as a physical sub-
strate for the wave theory of light.14
14The most extensive recent study of the Mill-Whewell debate is by Snyder (2006, 1997b).
Snyder contextualizes the debate about scientific epistemology as only one aspect of a much
larger disagreement. For earlier views on the debate, see in particular Strong (1955), Buch-
dahl (1971), and Fisch (1985).
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Whewell saw traditional interpretations of Newton’s first rule as “an
injurious limitation of the field of induction” (Whewell 1860, 186).15 He
proposed a different account of induction, which has been labeled “anti-
thetical”. It involved both an empirical, objective element and an ideal,
subjective element.16 Whewell believed that in inducing theories from phe-
nomena, the mind has to furnish “conceptions” that appropriately “tie to-
gether” or “colligate” these phenomena. Such conceptions could be of var-
ious kinds. In the study of the shape of Mars’s trajectory, Kepler’s mind
supplied the conception of an ellipse to colligate the observed positions of
the planet. Newton later colligated the planetary trajectories by a new con-
ception: that of a force acting according to an inverse square law to produce
an elliptical path. Similarly, the conception of waves in a luminiferous ether
colligated the phenomena of light. Once an appropriate conception to col-
ligate phenomena was introduced, it was generalized and then tested by
its empirical consequences. Whewell’s account was thus consequentialist,
even though, as we will see below, there are significant differences between
it and its more recent cognates.
Mill disputed the reliability of consequentialist theory testing. He did
not reject hypotheses as such, since in the initial stages of inquiry hypothe-
ses about possible causes of a phenomenon were “allowable, useful, and
often even necessary” (Mill 1843, 21, III.XIV.§6). However, referring di-
rectly to Newton’s first rule, he insisted that eventually “[the cause’s] exis-
tence should be capable of being detected, and its connexion with the effect
ascribed to it should be susceptible of being proved, by independent evi-
dence” (496, III.XIV.§5). The luminiferous ether, although widely accepted,
did not meet these requirements:
The possibility of deducing from its supposed laws a consider-
able number of the phenomena of light, is the sole evidence of
its existence that we have ever to hope for; and this evidence
cannot be of the smallest value, because we cannot have, in the
case of such an hypothesis, the assurance that if the hypothesis
15Whewell discussed Newton’s rules at length in his Philosophy of Discovery (1860, Ch. 18).
See also the exchange between Robert Butts (1970; 1973) and David Wilson (1973) on Whe-
well’s attitude to true causes.
16Whewell (1840; 1847, especially book XI). On Whewell’s epistemology, see Snyder
(2006, Ch. 1), and see Yeo (1993) for additional historical context. The term “antithetical”
derives from Fisch (1985).
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be false, it must lead to results at variance with the true facts.
(22, III.XIV.§6)
Like Reid before him, Mill thought it insufficient to save the phenomena,
because unconceived alternative hypotheses might save them just as well.
Unlike earlier consequentialists, however, Whewell did not recommend
the acceptance of hypotheses merely because they accounted for a wide
range of phenomena. He articulated three further “Tests of Hypotheses”
(Whewell 1847, XI.V.III, Art. 10–13). First, an hypothesis needed to “fore-
tel” or predict phenomena. Second, it needed to explain phenomena of a
different kind from the oneswhich originally led to the hypothesis. Whewell
called this the “consilience” (or “leaping together”) of inductions. Third and
finally, hypotheses needed to cohere over time and to tend towards simplic-
ity. Whewell argued that the luminiferous ether met these criteria, since ex-
periments had confirmed the optical phenomena predicted by Young and
Fresnel. Moreover, the theory’s further explanatory successes, such as po-
larization and double refraction, were instances of consilience.
It would go beyond the scope of this paper to trace the further thrusts
and parries of the debate in detail. Whewell argued that consilience gave
a theory “a stamp of truth beyond the power of ingenuity to counterfeit”
(Whewell 1849, 61). Mill countered that even false theories, if they are good
enough to account for some phenomena, should naturally be expected to
account for somemore. Famously, he wrote that only the “ignorant vulgar”
were impressed by successful predictions.17 It is safe to say that the debate
found no resolution at the time.
Modern commentators, however, have generally favoredWhewell’s po-
sition on the existence criterion.18 We have seen that Laudan held the vera
causa standard to be limited to observables, and he argued that consequen-
tialist approaches such as Whewell’s were necessary for inquiries into un-
observables. In her more recent study of the Mill-Whewell debate, Snyder
(1997b, 2006) arrived at similar conclusions. To be sure, she corrected earlier
authors (especially Laudan) who had assimilated Whewell too closely to
twentieth-century consequentialist theories of evidence. While modern ac-
counts allow for the free invention of hypotheses, Whewell’s epistemology
17In later editions, the ignorant vulgar became the merely “uninformed” (Mill 1974, 500,
III.XIV.§6).
18But see Peter Achinstein’s (1992) review of Lipton’s Inference to the Best Explanation.
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demanded an inductive path from phenomena to theories (Snyder 1997a,
2006, 2009). Only theories generated by appropriate inductions could be
supported by consequentialist evidence, contra Laudan (1981c).19 Never-
theless, Snyder agreed with Laudan that “Mill’s inductive methodology,
unlike Whewell’s, does not allow inferences to any hypotheses about un-
observable properties or entities” (188 Snyder 1997b, original emphasis).
Thus, she concluded that Whewell’s views conformed more closely than
Mill’s “to the practice of scientists such as Kepler, Newton, and Fresnel,
who do attempt to discover laws involving unobservables” (195).
In addition to criticizing the existence criterion, Whewell also criticized
Mill’s competence criteria. He granted that the four methods of experimen-
tal inquiry would allow inferences if they could be applied, but he objected
that the difficulty was “the reduction of the phenomena to formulæ such as
are here presented to us” (Whewell 1849, 44, §42). Howwere we to find the
required combinations of conditions and phenomena? Whewell thought
that the methods “take for granted, the very thing which is most difficult
to discover” (44, §42). Mill had failed to show that the four methods had
actually played a role in significant discoveries in the history of science:
Who will carry these formulæ through the history of the sci-
ences, as they have really grown up; and showus that they these
fourmethods have been operative in their formation; or that any
light is thrown upon the steps of their progress by reference to
these formulæ? (Whewell 1849, 45, §42)
Mill’s answer to this historical challenge spanned amere paragraph, and his
preference for toy examples (such as “dogs bark” to illustrate themethod of
agreement or “fire burns” to illustrate the method of difference) did little to
reveal themethods’ actual usefulness in scientific practice (Mill 1974, 431–2,
III.IX.§6).20
Surprisingly, perhaps, Mill himself took the scope of the method of dif-
ference, in particular, to be severely limited. We have already seen that
he had a very demanding notion of when two instances were sufficiently
comparable to allow an inference. In keeping with this view, he judged
the method to be “entirely unavailing” in the complex systems studied by
19Cobb (2012) made a similar argument for the case of Herschel.
20However, Cobb (2011) argued that Mill’s historical examples do not entirely deserve
their bad reputation.
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physiologists or social scientists (Mill 1974, 451, III.X.§8). As an example,
he discussed the question of whether mercury can cure a particular dis-
ease. We might try to find an answer by comparing a patient both before
and after the administration of mercury. But Mill thought this could not
work:
The mercury of our experiment being tried with an unknown
multitude (or even let it be a known multitude) of other influ-
encing circumstances, the mere fact of their being influencing
circumstances implies that they disguise the effect of the mer-
cury, and preclude us from knowing whether it has any effect
or not. (Mill 1974, 450, III.X.§8)
On Mill’s account, the method of difference demanded not only that we
exclude all unknown antecedent conditions, but also that we suppress all
known causes of the phenomenon, or at least that we “make them such that
we can compute and allow for their influence” (450). This made inferences
impracticable:
Unless we already knew what and howmuch is owing to every
other circumstance, (that is, unlesswe suppose the very problem
solved which we are considering the means of solving,) we can-
not tell that those other circumstances may not have produced
the whole of the effect, independently or even in spite of the
mercury. (Mill 1974, 450, III.X.§8)
Since direct inferences to causes in complex systems were impossible, Mill
thought that only basic regularities were to be determined experimentally.
Most of science would proceed deductively from these basic regularities
(Mill 1974, 481–83, III.XIII.§7).
Recent commentators have generally agreed that Mill’s methods can
demonstrate competence only within narrow limits. We saw above that
Snyder took Mill’s methods to be restricted to observable causes. Simi-
larly, Peter Lipton (2004, 126–28) argued that Mill’s method of difference
was only a first-pass description of many scientific inferences. Like Syn-
der, he thought it was limited to observables. Moreover, he argued that the
method gave us no satisfying guidance on how to judge the comparabil-
ity of two instances – on how to distinguish between relevant differences
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and abundant irrelevant ones. He suggested that his account of inference
to the best explanation could repair these defects. Even though we had no
direct access to whether a sole unobservable difference existed between in-
stances, we could make the subjunctive judgment that if such a difference
existed, then it would explain a difference in experimental outcomes. In
effect, he held that Mill’s methods needed to be subsumed by a consequen-
tialist framework (for discussion, see Scholl 2015).
3 Claude Bernard on the epistemology of experimen-
tal medicine
We saw that the vera causa standard is supposed to have failed as a viable
epistemology of science around the middle of the nineteenth century, and
that this failure has been explained as a result of the standard’s epistemic
limitations. The existence requirement has been interpreted as limiting sci-
entific inquiry to observables, and the competence requirement as being too
demanding for most practical purposes. In this section I will argue that far
from disappearing as a regulative ideal, the vera causa standard was at the
core of the developing epistemology of the nineteenth-century life sciences.
I will refer to thework of the French physiologist Claude Bernard (1813–
1878) as a guide to the leading edge of nineteenth-century methodological
thinking in experimental biology andmedicine. When his Introduction to the
Study of Experimental Medicinewas published in 1865, Bernardwas fifty-two
years old and a world-renowned physiologist (Olmsted and Harris Olm-
sted 1952; Grmek 2008). He had contributed a series of significant studies,
particularly on digestion and hepatic glycogenesis (Holmes 1974) and on
the mode of action of various poisons, including carbon monoxide and cu-
rare (Grmek 1973). With the Introduction, Bernard established himself, in
addition, as a methodologist and philosopher of science (Gayon 2015).
Bernard’s Introduction never mentioned the term vera causa or Newton’s
first rule. It may thus seem contrived to situate it within the vera causa tra-
dition. However, we will see below that Bernard’s methodological thought
aligns very closely with the tradition. One way to explain this correspon-
dence would be to argue that Mill and others correctly described aspects
of scientific practice, and that Bernard, although perhaps unfamiliar with
the methodological writers, was well trained in that practice. But there is
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also abundant evidence of direct influence. Even though Mill is not men-
tioned in the Introduction, Bernard was familiar with his writings. In an un-
dated note published posthumously, Bernard explained that he concerned
himself with scientific invention, something that, in his view, had been ne-
glected “by philosophers and even by Mill”.21 This suggests that Bernard
held Mill in particularly high esteem. Bernard’s exchange of letters with
Marie Raffalovich also testifies to Bernard’s knowledge of Mill. In the years
1873 and 1874, he inquired about Raffalovich’s views on Mill and men-
tioned him as a corrective to other authors, andRaffalovich even considered
translating a recent biography of Mill into French (Bernard 1950, 174, 176).
None of these references toMill can be dated to before the appearance of the
Introduction in 1865. But as wewill see below, the Introduction itself strongly
suggests that Bernard was already familiar with Mill’s views on the nature
and scope of experimental methods. Furthermore, Bernard was acquainted
with the methodological views of August Comte. In his Cours de philosophie
positive, Comte (1838) argued that experimental methods had only limited
power in biology (see especially pp. 320ff.). His views agreed closely with
those of Mill, and not coincidentally. The Cours is known as a significant
influence onMill at the time of the composition of the System of Logic (Bour-
deau 2018), and Comte andMill corresponded extensively for several years
(Haac 1995). Canguilhem (1967, 30–31) suggested that Bernard often con-
trasted his ownmethodological viewswith Comte’s, even though, likeMill,
Comte was not mentioned by name.22
Bernard’s innovations within the vera causa tradition likely had a signifi-
cant influence on subsequent methodological thinking. However, the story
of the reception of Bernard’s methodological thought is (unsurprisingly)
complicated. In a survey of the reception of the Introduction, Grmek (1973,
8–16) noted that French scientists paid little attention to it in the first decades
after its publication, while American and British scientists read it avidly.
The book’s philosophical receptionwas the reverse. Philosophers discussed
it in France, but not in theUnited States, Britain, or Germany. But even if the
Introductionwas unevenly received, Bernard’s scientific contributions were
widely appreciated, and they may have provided a methodological tem-
21“[J]em’occupe de l’invention scientifique qui a été negligée par les philosophes etmême
par Mill” (Bernard 1937, 32).
22For a study of Bernard’s relationship to philosophy, and to Comtean Positivism in par-
ticular, see Virtanen (1960, Ch. 2 and 3).
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plate even to those who were unfamiliar with Bernard’s explicitly method-
ological works. What is more, a long series of international visitors passed
through Bernard’s laboratory and attended his lectures (Grmek 2008, 27).
Visitors from England and the United States, in particular, spread Bernard’s
findings and methodology in their home countries (Olmsted 1935a, 1935b;
Warner 2003).
With these preliminaries in place, let us turn to Bernard’s methodologi-
cal views. Like the traditional proponents of the vera causa standard, Bernard
believed that the goal of experiment was to “connect natural phenomena
with their necessary conditions or, in other words, with their immediate
causes” (57).23 He argued that the fundamental principles of reasoning
about proximate causes were the same across the sciences, but that biology
required “certain special principles of experimentation” (57).
The first sentence of the first chapter of the Introduction names the core
issues of Bernard’s methodological program:
Only within very narrow boundaries can man observe the phe-
nomenawhich surround him; most of them naturally escape his
senses, and mere observation is not enough. (5)
As Bernard expanded this comment, it amounted to two claims: First, sci-
entific reasoning is limited to observable causes only in the simplest cases,
and scientists usually need to rely on intricate detection processes thatmake
remote entities accessible. Second, “mere observation” only reveals the ex-
istence of phenomena. To elucidate causal relationships, sophisticated ex-
perimental practices are required. I will discuss the first point in Section 3.1,
and the second in Section 3.2.
3.1 Detection and intervention
Bernard took an expansive view of the kinds of entities for which the ex-
istence requirement could be met. He wrote that scientists had to increase
the power of their organs of sense “by means of special appliances”, even
as they equipped themselves with instruments that allowed them “to pen-
etrate inside of bodies, to dissociate them and to study their hidden parts”
23Except where otherwise indicated, quotations from the Introduction are from the English
translation by Henry Copley Greene (Bernard 1949), first published in 1927.
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(5). Bernard identified a “necessary order” of research from simple inves-
tigations, which study objects that can be examined with unaided senses,
to complex investigations, which “bring within our observation, by various
means, objects and phenomena which would otherwise remain unknown
to us forever” (5).
One way in which hidden causes could be made observable was by dis-
secting dead and living organisms. For instance, a gastric fistula gives ac-
cess to the interior of the stomach for the study of digestion. If this was
combined with experimental interventions on gastric nerves, the effects of
those nerves on the production of gastric juices could be studied (9).
However, rendering observable but unobservedprocesses visible bydis-
section was only a first step. Unobservable components of organisms also
needed to be rendered observable by appropriate means of detection. Ac-
cording to Bernard, in the life sciences “discovery of a tool for observation
or experiment is muchmore useful than any number of systematic or philo-
sophic dissertations” (171). To illustrate, he referred to his own research on
hepatic glycogenesis, which depended on his ability to detect the presence
of sugars in the blood vessels leading away from the liver. Such research
could only be conducted “after chemistry gave us reagents for recognizing
sugar, which were much more sensitive than those we had” (171). In his
original publication on a “new function” of the liver, Bernard discussed at
length the copper reduction test he employed, and he compared it in de-
tail to other available methods for detecting sugars (Bernard 1853, 16–30).
To Bernard, the transfer of such techniques represented a significant mode
of disciplinary integration. “Chemistry is most useful to physiologists in
giving themmeans of separating and studying individual compounds”, he
wrote (Bernard 1949, 73). The task of the physiologist was to use the access
that chemistry granted to these compounds in order to study their role in
living organisms.
Successful experimental inference usually required not only the detec-
tion of unobservable components, but also intervention upon them. In prin-
ciple, observation could furnish appropriate contrasting instances for de-
termining causal roles. Most of the time, however, it would be necessary to
bring about the required contrasts by intervention:
[E]xperimenters must be able to touch the body on which they
wish to act, whether by destroying it or by altering it, so as to
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learn the part which it plays in the phenomena of nature. (9)
As in the case of detection, we should not conceive of “touching” an object
merely in macroscopic terms. While the vivisectionist’s scalpel was cer-
tainly one way of suppressing or altering organic processes, Bernard un-
derstood dissection broadly as “a displacing of a living organism by means
of instruments and methods capable of isolating its different parts” (105).
For this purpose, macroscopic vivisection was limited:
Our instruments for vivisection are indeed so coarse and our
senses so imperfect that we can reach only the coarse and com-
plex parts of an organism. (104)
To reveal and intervene upon unobservable causes, more fine-grained in-
terventions were necessary. Sometimes this would mean dissecting under
a microscope, although this procedure was limited to animals sufficiently
small to fit under the instrument. Even more subtle interventions were of-
ten needed:
[W]hen we reach the limits of vivisection we have other means
of going deeper and dealing with the elementary parts of or-
ganisms where the elementary properties of vital phenomena
have their seat. We may introduce poisons into the circulation,
which carry their specific action to one or another histological
unit. (104)
Bernard’s own work on toxic substances exemplifies the approach of using
poisons as means of dissection (Bernard 1857, 1878). He wrote:
I have particularly considered toxic agents as kinds of physio-
logical instruments that are more delicate than our mechanical
means, and that are destined to dissect, so to speak one at a time,
the properties of the anatomical elements of the living organ-
ism.24
Bernard conducted a long series of studies on the physiological properties
and mechanism of action of the arrow poison curare (Bernard 1857, Ch. 16–
23). He already had one key instrument at his disposal: he was able to
24Bernard (1857, v, my translation).
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stimulate nerves or muscles by electrical currents, that is, by “galvanizing”
them. In the normal state, the stimulation of motor nerves would lead to
muscular contractions, as would direct stimulation of the muscles them-
selves. Crucially, if curare was administered to animals ranging from frogs
to dogs, electrical stimuli applied to motor nerves no longer had an effect,
although the muscles continued to contract if stimulated directly. Mean-
while, sensation was not impaired. Bernard concluded that the poison af-
fects only the motor nerves while leaving other physiological systems in-
tact. He took this to explain how curare causes death: The poison even-
tually paralyzes the motor nerve leading to the diaphragm, thus stopping
breathing. To demonstrate the correctness of the explanation, Bernard kept
animals alive by forced ventilation (using a caoutchouc bladder to inflate
their lungs) until the effects of curare passed, at which point they contin-
ued to live unimpaired.
Having found that curare affects the motor nerves but not the muscula-
ture, Bernard could now use the poison in further studies as an agent block-
ing motor nerves selectively. For example, he used it to study heart rate
regulation (Bernard 1857, Ch. 25). Using curare as an instrument of (phys-
iological) dissection allowed Bernard “to penetrate into the most hidden
corners of our constitution”.25
Bernard had succeeded in connecting death from curare poisoning with
proximate causes. However, he cautioned that these causes were not some
absolute limit of science. They were a limit only “with regard to our too
feeble current means of investigation”.26
Bernard’s emphasis on gaining access to remote or unobservable causes
by suitable instruments was not without precedent in the vera causa tra-
dition. Reid, for example, remarked that “telescopes, microscopes, cam-
era obscuras, [and] magic lanthorns … give just and true information, and
the laws of nature by which they are produced, are of infinite benefit to
mankind” (Reid 1863, 338).27 Similarly, Herschel thought that instruments
permitted scientists to extend their observational abilities and to expand the
25Bernard 1878, 298, my translation.
26Bernard 1878, 301, my translation.
27Wood (1989) has argued that Reid’s demand for evidence of an entity’s existence was
not, contra Laudan, a demand for direct perception (see also Callergård 1999). Notably, Reid
endorsed Benjamin Franklin’s theory of the electrical fluid as an hypothesis to be pursued
further.
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store of entities that are known to exist. In one striking passage, he wrote
that the telescope “has conferred upon [man], if not another sense, at least
an exaltation of one already possessed by him that merits almost to be re-
garded as a new one” (Herschel 1830, §284, 256–57).
In thePrinciples of Geology, Charles Lyell (another prominent exponent of
the vera causa standard) wrote that wemust become “sensible of our natural
disadvantages” and extend our senses:
We are called upon, in our researches into the state of the earth,
as in our endeavours to comprehend themechanismof the heav-
ens, to invent means for overcoming the limited range of our
vision. We are perpetually required to bring, as far as possible,
within the sphere of observation, things to which the eye, unas-
sisted by art, could never obtain access. (Lyell 1830, 83)
He linked progress in geology to magnifying instruments, and in the true
vera causa spirit he contrasted thosewhowere “persevering in the attempt to
improve their instruments” with those who were “engaged in the indolent
employment of framing imaginary theories” (84).
Even Mill, in later editions of the System, granted that the luminiferous
etherwas “not in its own nature entirely cut off from the possibility of direct
evidence in its favour” (Mill 1974, 499, III.XIV.§6). Evidence that the ether
may be offering resistance to themotion of celestial bodies promised at least
the possibility of detection. If confirmed, Mill thought that this might help
the luminiferous ether to make “a considerable advance towards the char-
acter of a vera causa” (499, III.XIV.§6).
In brief, Bernard’s emphasis on instruments for detection and interven-
tion reflects a sophisticated version of the existence criterion. His position
is not, however, a radical departure from earlier authors in the vera causa
tradition, who consistently allowed for the detection of unobserved or un-
observable entities by instruments. It would exceed the scope of this paper
to study whether proponents of the tradition (including Bernard) ever gave
a coherent account of how we establish access to unobservables without,
at bottom, relying on some sort of consequentialist reasoning. But we can
firmly reject the notion that the existence criterion was taken to bar unob-
servable entities from causal explanations.
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3.2 Comparison and control
To demonstrate that a cause is competent to produce the effects ascribed to
it, Bernard, likeHerschel andMill, took comparison to be key. Hewrote that
“science can be established only by the comparative method” (2), since it
compares facts and “tests one by another” (5).28 There are at least two senses
in which Bernard took comparison to be fundamental to the methodology
of science in general and of the life sciences in particular. He labeled these
as “counterproof” and “comparative experiment”.
Bernard regarded the counterproof as the main principle of experimen-
tal reasoning. Even if we already have “proof that a given condition always
precedes or accompanies a phenomenon”, this does not allow us to infer
that the condition is really the cause of the phenomenon (55). What is re-
quired is a demonstration that removing the condition also removes the
phenomenon. Bernard wrote that “the only proof that one phenomenon
plays the part of cause in relation to another is by removing the first, to stop
the second” (56). The counterproof was “a necessary and essential char-
acteristic” of experimental reasoning which “decides whether the relation
of cause to effect, which we seek in phenomena, has been found” (55–56).
And Bernard cautioned that “proof, in science, never establishes certainty
without counterproof” (56). The counterproof, then, was a test of causation,
closely related to Herschel’s seventh rule, or Mill’s method of difference.
The proximity of Bernard’s views to the vera causa tradition, and his
rejection of consequentialism, are evident in his discussion of hypotheses.
Like Mill, Bernard did not reject hypotheses outright. He thought that they
were “auxiliaries to the [experimental] method, indispensable as scaffold-
ing is necessary in building a house” (51). Anticipating a version of the
discovery-justification distinction, he wrote that when “devising experi-
ments or imagining means of observation … we must give free rein to our
imagination” (24). But hypotheses must be “regulated and given a crite-
rion” (24). That criterion was the counterproof:
[W]e may say that in all experimental reasoning there are two
possibilities: either the experimenter’s hypothesis will be dis-
proved [infirmée] or it will be proved [confirmée] by experiment.
When experiment disproves his preconceived idea, the experi-
28Note well that in the French original, “to test” is “contrôler” (Bernard 1865, 12).
26
menter must discard or modify it. But even when experiment
fully proves [confirme pleinement] his preconceived idea, the ex-
perimenter must still doubt; for since he is dealing with an un-
conscious truth,29 his reason still demands a counterproof. (52)
The differences between Bernard’s methodology and consequentialism are
glaring. Consequentialists would take an hypothesis to be judged by the
agreement or disagreement of its consequences with observable phenom-
ena – perhaps with the proviso that a subset of consequences counts dispro-
portionately or exclusively, such as novel predictions onWhewell’s account
or falsifying instances onPopper’s.30 But Bernard insisted instead on the ex-
traordinarily strict criterion of the counterproof, which requires us to detect
and intervene upon a suspected cause in order to show that its suppression
or alteration affects the phenomenon ascribed to it. Thus, Bernard agreed
with Mill that hypotheses were allowable, useful, and often even necessary
as scaffolding. But acceptance required direct evidence of existence and
competence.
Bernard’s account of method went far beyond those of the well-known
exponents of the vera causa tradition in terms of detail and practicability. He
recognized that the notion of a counterproof described only the ideal core
of a reasoning strategy:
Counterproof has not the slightest reference to sources of error
that may be met in observing facts; it assumes that they are all
avoided and is concerned only with experimental reasoning; it
has in view only judging whether the relation established be-
tween a phenomenon and its immediate cause is correct and ra-
tional. (127)
In practice, then, the difficulty was to obtain suitable instances for compar-
ison:
In animals, and especially the higher animals, experimentation
is so complex and liable to so many sources of error, both fore-
29Bernard referred to truths concerning the external world, as opposed to truths con-
cerning subjective experience, as “unconscious” truths [une véritée inconsciente], cf. Bernard
(1949, 28–29) and Bernard (1865, 51).
30See Malherbe (1981) for the altogether astounding claim that Popper’s methodology is
a formalization of Bernard’s.
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seen and unforeseen, that we must proceed most circumspectly
to avoid them. (126)
Recall thatWhewell doubted the power ofMill’s experimental methods not
because they were invalid as inference schemes, but because nature rarely
affords us suitable instances to which themethods are applicable. Mill him-
self thought the methods inapplicable to complex systems because of the
difficulty of finding comparable instances.
Bernard’s answer to these difficulties was that the counterproof needed
to be joined with a related but separate tool: comparative experimentation.
While the counterproof was about reasoning from given facts about differ-
ences occurring upon intervention, comparative experimentation related to
“ascertaining a fact and to the art of disengaging it from circumstances or
from other phenomena with which it may be entangled” (127). Bernard be-
lieved that progress in physiology would come not only from progress in
instruments and procedures, but most of all from the “reasoned and well-
regulated use of comparative experimentation” (Bernard 1865, 221, my trans-
lation and original emphasis).
Bernard argued that comparative experimentationwas “not exactlywhat
philosophers have called themethodof difference”.31 According to Bernard,
the method of difference suggests that we separate all the parts of a system
(Mill’s conditionsABC) and assign to each part its proper effect (Mill’s phe-
nomena a b c). In biology, however, it is rare that we can enumerate parts
comprehensively, let alone assign individual effects to each of them. Mill
had concluded from this that direct experimentationwas not feasible in suf-
ficiently complex systems. But Bernard diagnosed the problem differently.
He thought that Mill’s articulation of the method of difference demanded
too much to be practicable, but also more than was needed for an inference
to causality.
Comparative experimentation did not require the comprehensive enu-
meration of all the conditions that influence a phenomenon. Instead, the
task was only “completely to isolate the one phenomenon on which our
studies are brought to bear, separating it … from all surrounding compli-
cations” (128). Bernard wrote:
31“L’expérimentation comparative n’est pourtant pas précisément ce que les philosophes
one appelé la méthode par différence” (Bernard 1865, 222, my translation). Although no
philosophical writers are cited, it is likely that this is a reference to Mill’s System of Logic (see
the discussion on p. 19).
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Comparative experimentation reaches this goal by adding to a
similar organism, used for comparison, all our experimental changes
save one, the very one which we intend to disengage. (128)
If, for example, we wished to know the effect of ablating a deep-seated or-
gan, there is a danger of confusing the effects of the ablation itself with the
effects of the operative procedures required for gaining access to the organ
in the first place. The operation needed to be performed twice, once in its
entirety and once with the omission of the actual ablation:
We thus have two animals in which all the experimental condi-
tions are the same, save one,—ablation of an organwhose action
is thus disengaged and expressed in the difference observed be-
tween the two animals. (128)
Bernard’s crucial suggestion was that we can draw conclusions from ex-
periments on complex systems even when we are ignorant of a great many
conditions that influence the effect under study. We do not need to know
about them because they are, as it were, cancelled out by a suitably cho-
sen comparison. Bernard claimed boldly that the result of comparative ex-
perimentation is “to eliminate by a single stroke all known and unknown
sources of error” (127).
Bernard’s experimentalmethod is thus neither identical toMill’smethod
of difference nor an alternative to it. Both methods deploy the same cri-
terium for diagnosing causal relationships: that the effect must disappear
upon removal of the cause, other things being equal. This is what Bernard
called the counterproof. But the two authors differ in their treatment of the
ceteris paribus requirement. Mill articulated very strict prerequisites for ex-
perimental inferences that could rarely, if ever, bemet in practice. Bernard’s
comparative experimentation relaxed these prerequisites. It was a way to
realize counterproofs even in complex systems aboutwhichmuch remained
unknown.32
32My interpretation differs from Jutta Schickore’s in her recent book About Method (2017,
Ch. 7–9). I agree that Bernard’s comparative experimentation was not merely an “applica-
tion” of Mill’s method of difference. However, Schickore took Bernard’s counterproof to be
identical to the method of difference, and argued that Bernard rejected the counterproof in
favor of comparative experimentation for the purposes of biological inquiry (see especially
pp. 124–131). But Bernard understood the counterproof as indispensable to all experimen-
tal reasoning, and comparative experimentation not as an alternative to it, but merely as a
means “in complex circumstances, to simplify phenomena and to forearm oneself against
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Bernard refrained from discussing the theory of comparative experi-
mentation at great length and instead referred the reader to concrete ex-
amples. These examples reveal at least four ways in which comparative
experimentation helped to avoid errors. First, as already noted, compara-
tive experimentation implements the counterproof. Bernard told the story
of his researches into the fate of sugars in metabolism. Early on, he had fed
sweetened milk soup to a dog and then found sugar in the hepatic vessels.
The natural assumption was that the sugar he had found derived from the
soup. However, he conducted a comparative experiment on another dog
who had been fed only meat. That is, the suspected cause of the sugar in
the hepatic vessels, the dietary sugar, was removed. “Great was my aston-
ishment”, wrote Bernard, “at finding that the blood of the animal which
had not eaten any also contained sugar” (182). The counterproof showed
that dietary sugar was not necessary for the presence of sugar in the hep-
atic vessels. Eventually, this led Bernard to the recognition that the liver
synthesized sugar regardless of the composition of the dog’s diet.33
Second, comparative experimentation contributes to the test of the de-
tection procedures involved in the experiment. In the case discussed above,
Bernard had used the copper reduction test to detect sugar in the hepatic
vessels. While copper was known to react with sugar, Bernard hypoth-
esized that this “empirical characteristic” might also be shown “by sub-
stances still unknown in the bodily economy” (182). A positive result in
the comparative experiment could have been an indication that the copper
reduction tests produced such false positives.
Third, experimentation on comparable experimental objects reduces the
risk of confounding causes. The crucial question, of course, was whether
two experimental objects are in fact comparable. Bernard treated this as an
empirical matter. For instance, he was interested in the effect of various
substances on the glycogen content of the liver. However, even on similar
unforeseen sources of error” (Bernard 1949, 56). Notice that Bernard often referred to his
own comparative experiments as furnishing counterproofs (Bernard 1949, e.g., 153, 156,
164).
33This eventually led to the discovery of the process of hepatic glycogenesis, and it has
been studied in depth on the basis of extant laboratory notebooks (Grmek 1968, Holmes
1974, Ch. 18–19). While Bernard’s summary in the Introduction condenses and rearranges
the chronology of the process of discovery, it appears to describe the role of the counterproof
accurately. In this respect, Bernard’s methodological pronouncements matched his actual
experiments.
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diets, Bernard failed to find animals that were comparable in this respect.
He wrote:
According to their age, sex, plumpness, etc., animals bear star-
vation better orworse and destroymore glycogen or less, so that
I could never be sure that the differences I found were the result
of differences in diet. (183)
Bernard therefore conducted the experiment on a single animal. He re-
moved one part of the liver before the experimental intervention (an injec-
tion of food), and a second part afterwards, thus ensuring comparability.
Similarly, to study the effect of contraction on respiration in frog muscles,
the experiments needed to be performed on two limbs of the same animal,
“because in this respect two frogs are not always comparable” (183). Thus,
the appropriate comparison depended on the phenomenon under study. If
a phenomenon varied markedly due to unknown differences between or-
ganisms, then the comparison needed to occur within-organism.
Fourth and finally, comparative experimentation mitigates the risk of
fat-handed interventions. A fat-handed intervention is one that influences
the effect under study by a causal pathway that does not run through the
suspected cause that is the target of the intervention. For instance, Bernard
reported an experiment byMagendie, in which the object was to determine
the functions of cerebrospinal fluid. Experiments suggested that the re-
moval of cerebrospinal fluid resulted in a characteristic disturbance of mo-
tions. However, an accident revealed that the preparatory steps of the op-
eration sufficed to cause the disturbance. “Comparative experimentation”,
Bernard wrote, “would obviously have solved the difficulty” (182–83).
To conclude, Bernard’s comparative experimentation allowed inferences
even in contexts where known and even unknown confounders were in
play. In this respect it improved significantly on earlier articulations of the
method of difference such as Mill’s.
4 Conclusions
Claude Bernard did not consider himself a philosopher. He thought that
the truth is found by improving our techniques of investigation, and that
“the best philosophic system consists in not having any” (221). He rejected
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the builders of philosophical systems as vehemently as the positivists who
opposed them. He polemicized that in research, thosewho knewBacon and
his modern-day successors best achieved the least. Nevertheless, Bernard
must be understood, as I have done here, as a significant contributor to
nineteenth-century philosophical reflection on the nature and methods of
science.
On a received view of the history of scientific method, the vera causa
standard’s influence declined around the middle of the nineteenth century.
With its insistence on direct evidence for the existence and competence of
causes, the standard came to be regarded as a cumbersome restriction on
scientific inquiry into unobservables, and it was therefore abandoned in fa-
vor of a more powerful consequentialist alternative. The famous debate
betweenMill andWhewell has been taken to exemplify this shift, with Mill
defending the moribund vera causa standard against Whewell’s consequen-
tialism. Thus the old standard gave way to a version of the consequential-
ism that twentieth-century philosophers themselves favored.
In Bernard’s writings, however, we find a sophisticated version of the
vera causa standard that addressesmany of the epistemic limitations usually
ascribed to the approach. Bernard argued that unobservable causes needed
to bemade accessible by suitable chemical and physicalmeans for detecting
and intervening upon them. In addition, he developed a flexible account of
comparative experimentation that allowed him to infer causal relationships
even in complex systems in which known and unknown confounders ex-
isted. Bernard’s methodology was no doubt highly demanding in terms of
the evidence that it required for claims to be established, but it could not be
accused of limited scope.
None of this is to say that Bernard single-handedly solved all of the out-
standing problems of the vera causa tradition. Although his methodology
marked a powerful advance over previous articulations of the standard, it
faced its own limitations. For example, Bernard thoroughly rejected statis-
tical approaches. He argued that when all the conditions that are relevant
to an effect have been found, the effect occurs “always without exception”
(137), and so statistical analysis is superfluous in mature science. But his
successors of course came to rely heavily on probabilistic and statistical
tools in order to enable inferences in situations where full-fledged deter-
ministic understanding was far out of view. Thus, just as Bernard relaxed
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Mill’s very strict prerequisites for valid experimental inferences, his suc-
cessors would find ways to relax Bernard’s own methodological demands
further, and to expand the scope of experimental inquiry again. In this and
other respects, Bernard is an important link rather than an endpoint in the
history of scientific epistemology.
It would be merely facetious to declare Bernard the out-of-competition
winner of the debate between Mill and Whewell. But Bernard was a sig-
nificant exponent of a non-consequentialist tradition of scientific reasoning
and practice, whose scope and power have been underappreciated. Ar-
guably, this tradition, with its focus on establishing veræ causæ, still under-
pins much of experimental biology today and for this reason alone must be
better understood. But there are broader philosophical implications. It was
fittingly Laudan (1995) who identified consequentialist theories of evidence
as a curse on all of philosophy. If he was right, then there is still much to be
learned from the tradition whose tenets Bernard helped to articulate.
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